Chapter Four

4. Macroeconomic policy, fiscal federalism and regions

Macroeconomic policies can be designed so that they affect regions in different ways. The goals of such a "positive" discrimination can be different too: achieving accelerated development for some of them; smoothening uneven distribution of wealth or giving an initiative for the development of an industry which has or may have a comparative advantage in a region.

The aim of this section is to consider a different kind of federal policy, not directly targeting regional discrimination, however, unevenly affecting regions. In fact, as long as regional disparities take place, any macroeconomic policy is discriminative in the sense that it inevitably causes interregional redistribution of wealth. This is especially true for fiscal policies in federative countries. With regard to changes in budgetary policy, this fact was studied, from the theoretical perspective, in Quigley and Rubinfeld (1986).

By the very nature of fiscal federalism, the fiscal system is designed to achieve national goals and priorities and to redistribute wealth across the country’s regions. (See Musgrave, 1969 and 1971; Musgrave, Case and Leonard, 1974).

Figure 4.1a represents the general structure of fiscal flows in a federal system with three levels of government. Both "bottom-up" flows of taxes collected by different levels of governments and "top-bottom" flows of operational grants and expenditures are indicated with arrows of different colours. A few of the real federal systems may have all or only some of the represented flows.

After taxes are collected by the federal and state governments, one or both of the following reasons may cause a redistribution of income:

• Operational grants from a higher to a lower level of government (if they are a feature of a particular country’s fiscal system) are not proportional to the amount of tax collected; or
• The expenditure flows of the government, which occur across space, are distributed to states or local regions not proportionally to "bottom-up" fiscal flows.

In this section, we consider regional consequences caused by a restructuring of the fiscal system. The currently debated reform of the federal taxation system in Australia is used as an example. Theoretical analysis is undertaken using a two region/two product model. The aim of the modelling exercise is to illustrate the imminence of the uneven impact on regions of a government budget.

4.1. Case Study 2. Proposed federal tax reform in Australia

4.1.1. Background. The Australian taxation system

The Australian taxation system has all the features demonstrated in Figure 4.1. All three levels of government collect various taxes, which form a particular component of their budgets. Meanwhile, another component of the state and local budgets is operational grants form higher to lower level governments. Unlike the USA, in Australia the federal component of the fiscal revenue plays a considerable role in the formation of not only the federal, but also state budgets.

The Australian Taxation Office collects three major federal taxes:

• income tax;
• capital gains tax; and
• fringe benefits tax

Income taxis based on the assessable income of Australian residents and legal entities, applicable tax rates and some allowed deductions. Regional disparities in per capita tax exist as long as there are disparities in per capita income flows.

Capital gains taxis paid when a capital asset is disposed at a price, which is higher than the price originally paid for the asset. The amount of the capital gains tax collected across regions differs as long as the amount of capital transactions are different.

Fringe benefits tax is payable by employers proportionally to non-income benefits they provide to their employees. Historically different sectors of the Australian economy have had different proportions of fringe benefits in their remuneration packages to their employees. Therefore, regional differences in the industry structure may cause relative differences in fringe benefits tax flows.

Several taxes are collected by means other than the Australian Taxation Office. The most important, in terms of tax revenue, is sales tax . Sales tax is a wholesale tax. The rates are set by the Federal government and are uniform across states, but different for different products. Some products such as food are not taxable. Services are not subject to this tax. Regional disparities in tax liability with regard to sales tax are also determined by different industrial structures.

4.1.2. The governmental proposal of taxation reform. Pro and contra arguments in the public debate

After extensive debate during the recent decade, the current Liberal Coalition Government was re-elected with a comprehensive taxation reform on the agenda. The following measures were debated:

• Income tax reduction through a reduction of the marginal rates and increasing the tax free threshold;
• Eliminating the wholesale taxes;
• Elimination or reduction of several other indirect or excise taxes;
• Introduction of a capital gains tax free threshold for capital gains on small transactions;
• Shifting the fiscal responsibility for fringe benefit taxes from employers to employees; and
• Introduction of a broad Goods and Services Tax (GST) .

The GST is supposed to be levied on each transaction in the production, distribution and supply chain (with credit being given for GST paid up the chain). Contrary to the experience of some other federative countries like the USA, it is supposed to be uniform across states. The Federal Government proposes the GST to be levied on as broad a spectrum of goods and services as possible. However, not all the transactions are technically possible to tax; and interest groups lobby different exemptions. Therefore, it is argued that some items should be excluded from the GST. Among the debated items are: food; sales of second hand goods except margin added; private sales; exports; medical services; education; international air and sea travel; childcare; charitable activities and religious services; financial services; residential rent; disposal of private residences; give-aways; etc.

The proposed reforms are supported by a rather broad community of business people and analysts. The following arguments have been put forward:

1. Such a reform has been long overdue.
2. Inflation tends to move taxpayers to higher tax margin brackets. Therefore income tax, to a greater extent, becomes a disincentive to work harder and to earn more; and income tax reduction is necessary.
3. The Australian economy is an extremely open one. Wholesale and excise taxes appear to be indirect taxation on exports, making Australian exports less competitive. For example, the existing excise tax on fuel is added to the costs of farm products and, therefore, decreases their competitiveness.
4. The proposed GST reduces opportunities for tax avoidance, as even cash income owners and quasi-legal "tax-minimisers" will be paying taxes through goods and services transactions.
5. The GST has a potential to increase the propensity to save and invest.

Arguments of the opponents are related to welfare implications in the immediate short run.

Income groups, spend different proportions of their incomes on goods and services. They also have different consumption baskets. Lower income groups earners have lower proportions of those goods subject to the abolition of the wholesale sales tax. One of the consequences of the proposed restructuring of the fiscal system will be increased prices for most goods and services as the result of the GST. Low-income groups, who are in low income tax brackets, will not gain much as the result of decrease income tax rates. Neither do they have discretionary income sufficient for increasing their savings. At the same time, they will lose relatively more from increased prices, compared to higher income groups.

The advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reform are discussed mainly in the economic and social context, but ignore regional perspectives. Regions have different structures of industries and hence the impact of the fiscal reform will be felt differently by regions, depending upon the proportion, in each region, of sectors more sensitive to reform. The same is true with regards to regional disparities in income and expenditure structures.

The regional disparities, in the context of proposed reforms, can be considered with regard to broad geographic areas (metropolitan, urban other than metropolitan and rural), states, or sub-state levels of aggregation.

In the following section, some empirical estimates are demonstrated with regard to short-run effects of the taxation reforms on household income and expenditure in broad geographic areas. A model illustration is presented of the disparities caused by regional differences in industry structure.

4.2. Regional impact of fiscal policy: An approach to empirical and theoretical analysis.

Some empirical estimates

The Australian Bureau of Statistics periodically conducts comprehensive income and expenditure surveys across Australian states and broad geographic areas . The survey distinguishes certain income groups, categories of households and expenditure on different groups of goods and services.

Australian regions (both states and broad geographic areas) differ with regard to total disposal income, aggregate regional expenditure and the structure of expenditure by categories of goods and services and by groups of households (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 [the data is based on Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1994]). Therefore, the consequences of the reforms should be expected to differ across regions. This hypothesis is demonstrated below using broad geographic area data. The following assumptions are used for the numerical experiment.

The Federal Government introduces a 10% GST (this is the rate of GST currently under consideration).

The income tax rate is reduced to return to the taxpayers the gain received as the result of the introduction of GST.

The rest of the taxes are left unchanged.

The reform is federal budget neutral.

In addition, special statistics are introduced for the inter-regional comparison of income and expenditure distribution - Cultural Subsistence Level of Expenditure for Goods and Services . Let us define it as:

The amount of the household’s weekly expenditure for goods and services which does not exceed the household’s disposable income per week, but does not allow any savings.

We assume that in the current economic and cultural situation of a particular country, there are no degrees of freedom in making expenditure decisions below the Cultural Subsistence Level. Looking at the cross-section data of income and expenditure sorted in ascending order (Figure 4.1b), a percentage of households spend more than their income. The empirical point of intersection is $491.20 per household per week. It is the break-even point. This point can be used as an estimate of the Cultural Subsistence Level of Expenditure for Goods and Services. Disposable income less Cultural Subsistence Level of Expenditure constitutes the level of cultural discretionary income, or the part of disposable income, that households can use for discretionary purposes.

The results of the numerical experiments are demonstrated in Figure 4.2. One hundred per cent is the national average discretionary expenditure for goods and services by households in real terms. The bars represent the deviation of corresponding indicators in the regions from the national average in per cent. The blue bars are those deviations before, and burgundy bars after the reform of the taxation system is introduced. The results indicate a considerable difference in discretionary expenditure across Australian regions. The differences are expected to become even greater as a result of the reform.

Therefore, in the short run regions may be affected differently by the proposed reform measures. However, such consideration does not give an answer to questions about long run consequences of additional savings, investments, and more favourable conditions for businesses.

4.2.2. An approach to analysis using the two-region/two-sector model

Let us consider the variant of the reform affecting just two taxes. The income tax is reduced at a uniform rate and the goods and services tax is introduced uniformly across all regions, products, and services. The comparative impact of such a reform on each of the regions is evaluated looking at different variables. In the current Australian context of late 1990s, for example, a rather good economic climate is overshadowed by a rather high level of unemployment. Therefore, from the regional perspective, it is important to look at the impact of the taxation reform on regional levels of employment. This is considered below, using the two-region/two-sector illustrative model.

In the original model (2.1)-(2.7), no taxes were introduced, and disposable income depended only on wages. In such a context, the reduction in income tax can be interpreted as a negative income tax or an increment to disposable income. Therefore, after tax disposal income can be represented as:

, (4.1)

where

t (0<t<1) - rate of reduction in income tax;

M - pre-reform disposable income;

and - employment in both regions; and

and - pre-reform after-tax wage rates in both regions.

For simplicity, let us assume zero cross-price elasticities of demand. Then the demand function for each product depends upon the price of this product and aggregate demand for this product in both regions. Introduction of a new goods and services tax alone is interpreted as an addition to the consumer price for the output of both industries/regions, which changes the demand functions in the following way:

, (4.2)

, (4.3)

where g (0<g<1) is the uniform rate of GST; and other variables are defined as for the basic model in section 2.

In addition, in line with the discussion of microeconomic reforms in the previous section, the short-run case is considered with the production functions dependent only on the factor labour:

; (4.4)

. (4.5)

Let us consider relative changes in the demand for the product of each region as the result of changes in the taxation system. In terms of small relative changes of both income tax and GST rates, the differential form of demand functions is:

, (4.6)

, (4.7)

On the supply side, the producers in both regions do not see the prices changed, and therefore the supply functions (2.10) and (2.11) are left unchanged, as in the original model.

Finally, according to the concept of the reform, the total additional tax collected as the result of the introduction of GST is to be returned to the taxpayer as an income tax reduction. In terms of small changes this allows us to assume that:

(4.8)

The condition of equilibrium of demand and supply, in terms of this model, can be written as the result of combining (2.10) and (2.11) with (4.6) and (4.7):

, (4.9)

. (4.10)

The expressions for changes in prices are obtained as the result of combining the supply functions (2.10) and (2.11) with production functions (4.4) and (4.5):

(4.11)

(4.12)

Substitution of (4.11) and (4.12) in (4.9) and (4.10) for changes in prices and as well as substitution for from (4.8), after some transformations, gives the following expressions for changes in employment in each region:

(4.13)

(4.14)

Equations (4.13) - (4.14) demonstrate the dependence of regional changes in employment upon two common variables t and M. t – is a macroeconomic policy variable. Change in t reflects both the governmental decision on income tax reduction, and the loss of budget revenue compensated by the introduction of (or change in) GST. M is aggregate disposable income. In real terms, it is affected by both income tax reduction, and the introduction of a GST.

Even though the relative change in employment in each of the regions depends upon these two common variables, the magnitude of the impact is different and depends upon relative regional values of the elasticity parameters. In particular, greater income elasticity of demand or causes a greater increase in employment in the corresponding region. In contrast, greater negative values of price elasticity of demand for the regional product or contribute to a movement in the opposite direction, toward a greater decrease demand and, therefore, in employment. (These are negative parameters included in both equations (4.13) and (4.14) in denominators and with the negative sign.) Also, in the short run, higher labour costs of the regional product, reflected in equations (4.13) and (4.13) by labour elasticities of output and , cause a relatively slower increase in the employment in the corresponding region. (These are positive parameters included in both equations (4.13) and (4.14) in denominators and with the positive sign.)

Therefore, generally, reforming federal fiscal policies may contribute to regional disparities, in employment and in other regional economic variables.

4.3. Conclusions

Using the example of the fiscal reform proposed by the Australian Federal Government, the uneven impact of such a reform on regions was demonstrated based on both empirical data and a theoretical perspective. Disparities in the outcome of the reform across regions are attributable to the following:

1. Regional differences in the proportion of various income and expenditure groups of households. Income and expenditure groups’ contribution to the governmental budget varies both in total amount and in the amount contributed to different components of the tax mix. Therefore, any reform of the tax mix unevenly changes regional net income and expenditure patterns
2. Regional differences in industry mix.

• Changes in household income and expenditure patterns affect the industry/product composition of demand and therefore, regional employment.
• The sensitivity of demand for different products in the regional composition of output to changes in income as well as the impact on prices is different across regions.
• Changes in prices affect regions differently due to differences in the composition of elastic and inelastic goods in regional output.
• Employment in the regions with a higher proportion of industries producing income-elastic products is more sensitive to the reform. The sensitivity of employment is also different due to disparities, across regions, of the labour intensive industries.

4.4. Bibliography

4.4.1 References  

Australian Bureau of Statistics (1994). Household Expenditure Survey, 1993-94

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1998). A New Tax System Bill 1988

Musgrave, Richard A. (1969), "Theories of Fiscal Federalism," Public Finance, v24(4), 521-532.

Musgrave, Richard A. (1971), "Economics of Fiscal Federalism," Nebraska Journal of Business and Economics, v10(4), 3-13.

Musgrave, R. A., K. E. Case and H. Leonard (1974), "The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits," Public Finance Quarterly, v2(3), 259-312.

Quigley, John M. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1986), "Budget Reform And The Theory of Fiscal Federalism," American Economic Review, v76(2), 132-137.

4.4.2. For further reading

Fiscal Federalism

Bell, Christopher Ross (1988), "The Assignment of Fiscal Responsibility In A Federal State: An Empirical Assessment," National Tax Journal, , v41(2), 191-208.

Buchanan, J. M. (1950), "Federalism And Fiscal Equity," American Economic Review, 40(4), 583-599.

Clement, M. O. (1963), "Interstate Fiscal Equity And Federal Grants-In-Aid: An Empirical Method And Its Application, Fiscal 1952," Southern Economic Journal, v29(4), 279-296.

Gordon, Roger H. (1983), "An Optimal Taxation Approach To Fiscal Federalism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, , v98(4), 567-586.

Gramlich, Edward M. and Harvey Galper (1973), "State And Local Fiscal Behavior And Federal Grant Policy," Brookings Papers, v4(1), 15-58.

Greene, Kenneth V. "Fiscal Federalism, Spillovers, And The Export Of Taxes: A Comment," Kyklos, 1975, v28(2), 412-414.

Greene, Kenneth V. "Some Institutional Considerations In Federal-State Fiscal Relations," Public Choice, 1970, v9(1), 1-18.

Grossman, Philip J (1990), "The Impact Of Federal And State Grants On Local Government Spending: A Test Of The Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis," Public Finance Quarterly, v18(3), 313-327.

Hayden, F. Gregory (1973), "Fiscal Federalism: Program Budgeting And The Multilevel Governmental Setting," Nebraska Journal of Business and Economics, v12(1), 23-42.

Hettich, Walter and Stanley Winer (1986), "Vertical Imbalance In The Fiscal Systems Of Federal States," Canadian Journal of Economics, v19(4), 745-765.

Hewitt, Daniel. "Fiscal Illusion From Grants And The Level Of State And Federal Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 1986 v39(4), 471-484.

Inman, Robert P. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1992), "Fiscal Federalism In Europe: Lessons From The United States Experience," European Economic Review, v36(2/3), 654-660.

Kneebone, Ronald D. (1989), "Does Fiscal Policy Matter In A Federal Economy?," Journal of Macroeconomics, v11(4), 599-608.

Kremers, Jeroen J. M. (1989) "U.S. Federal Indebtedness And The Conduct Of Fiscal Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, v23(2), 219-238.

Loehr, William. (1974), "Fiscal Federalism, Spillovers And The Export Of Taxes: An Extension," Kyklos, v27(3), 606-609.

Maxwell, James A. (1970), "Fiscal Equity And Federalism," Growth and Change, v1(1), 39-45.

Musgrave, R. A. (1964), "On Measuring Fiscal Performance," Review of Economics and Statistics, v46(2), 213-220.

Musgrave, Richard A. (1950), "Fiscal And Monetary Problems In A High-Level Defence Economy: A Study In Taxable Capacity," American Economic Review, v40(2), 209-221.

Musgrave, Richard A. (1954), "The Fiscal Outlook," Journal of Business, , v27(1), 4.

Noam, Eli M. (1979), "Tax Limitations And Fiscal Federalism," National Tax Journal, v32(2)

Petersen, John E. (1981), "Federal Fiscal Policy And Aid To State And Local Governments: An Age Of Austerity," National Tax Journal, v34(3), 383-388.

Robinson, T. R. and T. J. Courchene. (1969), "Fiscal Federalism And Economic Stability: An Examination Of Multi-Level Public Finances In Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, v2(2), 165-189.

Roemer, Arthur C. (1981), "The New Focus Of Federal Fiscal Policies And Implications For State And Local Governments - State Observations," National Tax Journal, v34(3), 303-306.

Rudolph, Hedwig, Eileen Appelbaum and Friederike Maier. (1990), "The Changing Face Of Fiscal Federalism," Challenge, v33(6), 41-46.

Sandler, Todd M. and Robert B. Shelton (1972), "Fiscal Federalism, Spillovers And The Export Of Taxes," Kyklos, v25(4), 736-753.

Sandler, Todd and Robert Shelton. (1976), "Fiscal Federalism, Spillovers And The Export Of Taxes: Reply," Kyklos, v29(2), 315-316.

Shroder, Mark. 1995"Games The States Don't Play: Welfare Benefits And The Theory Of Fiscal Federalism," Review of Economics and Statistics, v77(1), 183-191.

Srivastava, D. K. and Pawan K. Aggarwal. (1979), "Measuring Tax Revenue Centralization In Federal Fiscal Systems: A Case Study Of India," Public Finance, v34(3), 414-433.

Strauss, Robert P. and Peter B. Harkins (1986), "The Net Fiscal Impact Of Selected Federal Block Grant Programs," Journal of Regional Science, , v26(1), 63-86.

Swartz, Thomas R. and John E. Peck. (1990), "The Changing Face Of Fiscal Federalism," Challenge, , v33(6), 41-46.

Teeters, Nancy H. (1972), "Outlook For Federal Fiscal Policy," Brookings Papers, v3(2), 467-477.

Tollison, Robert D. and Thomas D. Willett. (1978), "Fiscal Federalism: A Voting System Where Spillovers Taper Off Spatially," Public Finance Quarterly, v6(3), 327-342.

Wallis, John Joseph. (1991), "The Political Economy Of New Deal Fiscal Federalism," Economic Inquiry, v29(3), 510-524.

Wildasin, David E. (1987), "Federal-State-Local Fiscal Relations: A Review Of The Treasury Report," Public Finance Quarterly, v15(4), 472-499

Regional aspects of national tax system: theory and applied modelling

Bahl, Roy and David Puryear. (1976), "Regional Tax Base Sharing: Possibility And Implications," National Tax Journal, v29(3), 328-335.

Beemiller, Richard M. (1989), "Local Area Fiscal Impact Analysis Using The Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II)," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, v23(5), 261-269.

Bender, Lloyd D. and Bernal L. Green (1968), "Implications Of Negative Tax Plans as Antipoverty Measures In Low-Income Regions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, v50(5), 1421-1425.

Bruce, Neil (1995), "A Fiscal Federation Analysis of Debt Policies By Sovereign Regional Governments," Canadian Journal of Economics, v28(Spec), 195-206.

Bull, Nicholas, K. Hassett and G. Metcalf (1994), "Who Pays Broad-Based Energy Taxes? Computer Lifetime and Regional Incidence," Energy Journal, , v15(3), 145-164.

Clotfelter, Charles T. and Dan Feenberg. 1990"Is There A Regional Bias In Federal Tax Subsidy Rates For Giving?," Public Finance, v45(2), 228-240.

Danziger, Sheldon and Robert Haveman. (1977), "Tax And Welfare Simplification: An Analysis Of Distributional And Regional Impacts," National Tax Journal, v30(3), 269-284.

Fisher, Peter S. (1982), "Regional Tax Base Sharing: An Analysis And Simulation Of Alternative Approaches," Land Economics, v58(4), 497-515.

Garrison, Charles B. and John R. Kort (1983), "Regional Impact Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy: A Comment," Journal of Regional Science, v23(2), 249-262.

Golladay, Frederick and Robert Haveman. (1976), "Regional And Distributional Effects Of A Negative Income Tax," American Economic Review, v66(4), 629-641.

Greytak, David and Richard McHugh. (1978), "The Effects Of Federal Income Taxation And Inflation On Regional Income Inequalities," Journal of Regional Science, v18(1), 57-72.

Gripaios, P. and N. Brooks. (1982), "The Determination Of Employment In Counties: Some Evidence On The Importance Of Local Authority Fiscal Policy And Government Regional Policy In England And Wales," Applied Economics, v14(2), 211-218.

Hady, Thomas F. (1969), "Tax Structure And Regional Economic Growth: A Comment," Journal of Regional Science, v9(2), 325-326.

Hamilton, Howard D. (1954), "Taxes And Taconite: Iron Ore Tax Legislation In The Lake Surperior Region," National Tax Journal, v7(4), 342-354.

Haskell, Mark A. and Stephen Leshinski. (1969), "Fiscal Influences On Residential Choice: A Study Of The New York Region," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, v9(4), 47-56.

Hutton, J. P. and K. Hartley. (1968) "A Regional Payroll Tax," Oxford Economic Papers, v20(3), 418-427.

Jones, Rich and John Whalley (1988), "Regional Effects Of Taxes In Canada: An Applied General Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Public Economics, v37(1), 1-28.

Kramer, Randall A., Jr. and Leonard Shabman (1993), "The Effects Of Agricultural And Tax Policy Reform On The Economic Return To Wetland Drainage In The Mississippi Delta Region," Land Economics, v69(3), 249-262.

Mathur, Vijay K. and Sheldon H. Stein (1983), "Regional Impact Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy: A Reply," Journal of Regional Science, v23(2), 263-266.

Mathur, Vijay K. and Sheldon Stein. (1980), "Regional Impact Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy: An Investigation Into The Reduced Form Approach," Journal of Regional Science, v20(3), 334-352.

McLure, Charles E., Jr. (1980), "Administrative Considerations In The Design Of Regional Tax Incentives," National Tax Journal, v33(2), 177-188.

McLure, Charles E., Jr. (1969), "The Inter-Regional Incidence Of General Regional Taxes," Public Finance, v24(3), 457-483.

Morgan, W. Douglas and W. Elliot Brownlee. (1974), "The Impact Of State And Local Taxation On Industrial Location: A New Measure For The Great Lakes Region," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, v14(1), 67-78.

Morgan, William, John Mutti and Mark Partridge. (1989), "A Regional General Equilibrium Model Of The United States: Tax Effects On Factor Movements And Regional Production," Review of Economics and Statistics, v71(4), 626-635.

Mutti, John, William Morgan and Mark Patridge. (1989), "The Incidence Of Regional Taxes In A General Equilibrium Framework," Journal of Public Economics, v39(1), 83-108.

Rethwischk, Kurt (1974), "Federal Tax Incentives For Regional Growth: Comment," Southern Economic Journal, v41(2), 296-299.

Rinaldi, S., R. Soncini-Sessa and A. B. Whinston (1979), "Stable Taxation Schemese In Regional Environmental Management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, v6(1), 29-40.

Romans, Thomas and Ganti Subrahmanyam (1979), "State And Local Taxes, Transfers, And Regional Economic Growth," Southern Economic Journal, v46(2), 435-444.

Singer Neil M. (1974), "Federal Tax Incentives For Regional Growth: Reply," Southern Economic Journal, v41(2), 300-302.

Singer, Neil M. (1971), "Federal Tax Incentives For Regional Growth," Southern Economic Journal, v38(2), 230-237.

Steinnes, Donald N. (1984), "Business Climate, Tax Incentives, And Regional Economic Development," Growth and Change, v15(2), 38-47.

Struyk, Raymond J. (1967), "An Analysis Of Tax Structure, Public Service Levels, And Regional Economic Growth," Journal of Regional Science, v7(2), 175-184.

Struyk, Raymond J. (1969), "Tax Structure And Regional Economic Growth: A Reply," Journal of Regional Science, v9(2), 327-328.

(back)

(Opening Page)